Introduction by Goldman, Roger L.
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 32 
Number 1 Control of Police Misconduct in a 
Post-Exclusionary Rule World: Can It Be Done? 
(Volume XXXII, No. 1) 
Article 4 
2012 
Introduction 
Roger L. Goldman 
Saint Louis University School of Law, goldmanrl@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Goldman, Roger L. (2012) "Introduction," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 
4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/4 
This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
3 
INTRODUCTION 
ROGER L. GOLDMAN* 
On February 24, 2012, Saint Louis University School of Law and the Saint 
Louis University Public Law Review presented a symposium titled; “Control of 
Police Misconduct in a Post-Exclusionary Rule World: Can it Be Done?” In 
recent cases like Hudson v. Michigan,1 four members of the United States 
Supreme Court argued that excluding reliable evidence, which could result in 
letting guilty defendants go free, may have been necessary in 1961 when the 
Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states in Mapp v. Ohio,2 but times 
have changed. Other remedies were now effective in controlling police 
behavior, such as better training of police, civilian review boards, and civil 
suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Symposium brought together leading 
academics from a variety of disciplines and practitioners from the public and 
private sectors to discuss whether the three remedies mentioned in Hudson as 
well as other remedies are, in fact, effective in controlling police behavior. 
In her article, Stakeholder Participation in the Selection and Recruitment 
of Police: Democracy in Action, Professor Kami Chavis Simmons argues that 
the community-policing model, involving partnership between all segments of 
the community and the police who serve that community, would support 
citizen involvement in both the recruitment and selection of police officers. 
The vehicle for accomplishing this goal should be pattern and practice suits 
brought by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
Consent decrees entered into pursuant to Section 14141 currently stress the 
importance of community policing concepts in areas other than recruitment 
and hiring. And the DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS) has issued reports recognizing the value of citizen involvement in 
recruitment and hiring. The Author notes the existence of such efforts in 
various communities, including Sacramento and Detroit. She recommends that 
any consent decrees that include citizen involvement in recruitment and hiring 
should be monitored to make sure it does not lead to corruption; that all 
segments of the community are at the table, including those who are its most 
vulnerable members; and that there is an evaluation component to determine if 
the community benefited from the process. 
 
* Callis Family Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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With respect to the four federal remedies designed to deter police from 
constitutional violations—the exclusionary rule, civil suits under Section 1983, 
criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and pattern and 
practice suits under 42 U.S.C. § 14141—Professor Rachel Harmon argues that 
these remedies “are almost as good as they are ever going to get.” Her article, 
Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, describes in detail 
that any improvements in these remedies will be only marginally more 
effective in deterring misconduct. Instead of using the stick, that is, “making 
misconduct unappealing relative to reform,” which is what the current 
remedies do, she advocates using the carrot, that is, “making reform more 
appealing relative to misconduct.” Specifically, she suggests that the DOJ 
could provide technical assistance to departments willing to undertake reform 
measures and the COPS Office could give grants to departments for programs 
to promote civil rights. The DOJ could also agree not to bring suits under 
Section 14141 if a police department would adopt reforms. Any such efforts, 
however, would have to be evaluated to make sure desired outcomes were 
achieved. 
In his article, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The 
Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure, Professor Samuel Walker 
addresses a largely ignored question: once police reforms are adopted by a 
police department—particularly accountability-related reforms—do they 
become embedded in the culture or are they abandoned over time? Professor 
Walker discusses the failure of departments to institutionalize such reforms as 
anti-corruption efforts and team policing. He notes that it is uncertain whether 
community-oriented policing reforms will have more staying power, but there 
are hopeful signs that problem-oriented policing efforts will be 
institutionalized. With respect to accountability reform efforts, he focuses on 
consent decrees pursuant to Section 14141 and notes that there has been no 
systematic evaluation of the long-term benefits of the decrees. Professor 
Walker also observes that there is some hope police officers will be more 
receptive to accountability reform efforts than in the past because of the greater 
diversity among police officers in terms of education, gender, race, and 
ethnicity. What is more worrisome is resistance to change from police unions. 
Further, there may be differences among departments in terms of willingness 
to embrace accountability-related reforms. He focuses on one such department 
that has embraced reform efforts—the Charlotte, North Carolina Police 
Department—and uses it as a model for other departments. Finally, he 
recommends the use of a police auditor to monitor the continuity of reforms. 
In The Numbers Dilemma: The Chimera of Modern Police Accountability 
Systems, Professor James F. Gilsinan questions the usefulness of recent 
attempts to bring transparency and accountability to the management of police 
departments.  He notes six problems with these efforts to quantify criminal 
activities: 1) the question of what crimes should be included in the statistics; 2) 
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data can be manipulated for political reasons, e.g., kept low to encourage 
tourists, kept high to get money for more officers; 3) numbers can rise or fall 
easily, e.g., a crime spree might be one incident or 20 incidents; 4) context is 
more important than numbers; 5) measurement can hide judgment; and 6) there 
is pressure to produce good numbers. The adoption of programs like CompStat 
has not brought about better policing and has caused divisions between line 
officers and commanders. Various studies have shown that street officers 
conform to preexisting ideas of the way things ought to be. The Author notes 
the institutional pressures to act like other police departments—to imitate what 
others do rather than initiate change. Finally, the focus on data has not 
translated into information and knowledge, which are indispensable for real 
change. Paradoxically, he concludes, as these systems of accountability take 
root in an organization, the chance of true accountability and transparency is 
lessened. 
In his article, Police Training as an Instrument of Accountability, Professor 
David A. Klinger suggests that training on how to avoid use of excessive force 
must take into account four prototypical officers: 1) those who believe they are 
justified in using force as they see fit; 2) those who normally wouldn’t use 
unnecessary force, but would in certain situations, e.g., confronting a 
particularly heinous suspect; 3) those who do not know the rules; and 4) those 
who use poor tactics. Each of these prototypes must receive training tailored to 
their particular needs, which is not the norm in a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Professor Klinger concludes that there has not been enough empirical research 
on whether police training makes a difference on performance and 
recommends that given all the time and money spent on training, efforts should 
be made to measure its effectiveness. 
In the Hudson case, Justice Scalia assumed that civil liability under Section 
1983 for Fourth Amendment violations by police is an effective deterrent 
undermining the need for the exclusionary rule.3 In his article, Illegal Searches 
in Chicago: The Outcomes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, Professor Mark Iris 
examined the results of Section 1983 suits filed in 2009 against Chicago police 
officers alleging unconstitutional searches of the person, car, or home—a total 
of 187 cases. As he notes, the City of Chicago is quite transparent in posting on 
its website the amount it pays out in settlements or judgments. Of the cases 
filed in 2009, 139 were disposed of by the time he wrote his article, either by 
dismissal by one of the parties, settlement, or verdict. The total amount paid by 
the city for federal civil rights claims, not just unconstitutional searches, for the 
years 2008 to 2011 was over $125 million; an additional $80 million was paid 
for police-related civil suits in state court during this period, mainly arising 
from auto accidents with a police car. The author concludes that although 
 
 3. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598. 
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Chicago is paying a great deal of money for police officers’ misconduct, it is 
not at all clear that these payments—made by the city rather than the officer—
has a deterrent effect on the officers’ future behavior. 
For many years, this Author has been advocating the adoption of state laws 
that give a state agency the authority to revoke a police officer’s license for 
serious misconduct in the same way states may revoke the license of members 
of most other professions and occupations.4 In my contribution to this 
symposium issue, A Model Decertification Law, I describe the necessary 
components of a successful decertification law. Currently, forty four states 
have such authority. In the absence of such a law, an officer who is terminated 
from a police department for serious misconduct may seek employment at 
another department in the same state, where he is likely to repeat the conduct. 
First, all criminal justice officers must be subject to decertification, that is, not 
just police officers and deputy sheriffs, but also correctional officers and 
probation officers, among others. Second, the conduct that triggers 
decertification cannot be just criminal convictions—there must be authority to 
remove a license for conduct that does not result in a conviction, such as 
perjury by an officer whose testimony results in a defendant’s being found 
guilty.  Finally, experience has shown that some police departments—usually 
those that are small and underfunded—will not cooperate in reporting 
decertifiable conduct to the state agency. Therefore, there must be a 
combination of carrots and sticks to encourage their compliance. One reason 
for optimism that decertification laws will continue to be strengthened is that, 
unlike many other remedies, decertification can attract support from both the 
law enforcement and the civil rights and liberties communities: the former is 
interested in police professionalism, the latter in protecting citizens from 
officers whose previous conduct renders them unfit to serve. 
The articles published in this issue have attempted to assess the efficacy of 
various approaches to dealing with police misconduct: from the earliest stages 
of recruitment, hiring, and training; to on-the-job efforts of bringing about 
transparency and accountability and institutionalizing these reforms; and 
finally remedies such as court-supervised consent decrees, civil damages 
actions for unconstitutional searches, and criminal prosecutions and license 
revocation. A common thread runs through the articles—that much more 
empirical work remains to be done to measure the effectiveness of these 
reform initiatives. We thank all the conference presenters, especially those 
presenters who also contributed to this Symposium issue, and the editors and 
staff of the Public Law Review for their tireless efforts in putting on the 
conference and publishing this issue. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to 
Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45 (1987). 
